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Abstract 
The public R&D capital stock is introduced as a quasi-fixed input in a variable cost 
function. The relative shadow price allows the correct measurement of the equilibrium 
levels of quasi-fixed inputs thus explicitly assessing the hypothesis of public R&D under 
(over) investment. By introducing an appropriate R&D price in the long-run equilibrium, 
the model can also provide empirical evidence on the rationale driving public R&D 
investment and on the hypothesis that free-riding on public R&D can explain over-
investment. Moreover, the model allows a formal testing of the induced innovation 
hypothesis and a more accurate calculation of both internal rate of return to R&D and 
residual exogenous productivity growth. The empirical implications of the model are 




The role of public R&D investment as source of technical progress in agriculture has 
produced a growing debate (Echeverria, 1990; Schimmelpfenning et al., 2000). The 
empirical literature provides evidence that not only is the social rate of return of public 
R&D very high compared with that of investment in physical capital but, more importantly, 
since the second half of the eighties, a reduction of publicly funded research in agriculture 
has been taking place giving scope, in a number of developed and developing countries, for 
private R&D (Huffman - Just, 1999; OECD, 1995; Rausser, 1999). 
The apparent contradiction between actual policies and empirical evidence is intriguing.  
The major theoretical issue is what drives the level of public research investment. The 
rationale behind the public research investment is a subtle matter because it concerns a 
public good also producing private benefits since it can enhance input productivity in 
agriculture. It is also well known that constant returns to scale at the private farm level, and 
consequently the assumption of perfect competition, can be consistent with increasing 
returns to scale at the aggregate-sectoral level, whenever research investments behaves as a 
public good at the level of the agricultural sector (Jones, 1995; Griliches, 1995). These 
aspects also rise the major question how to define the optimal level of investment since this 
level can differ according to the private (farmers) or social point of view
1.  
In principle, we could think of a social planner using the private (conventional inputs) as 
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  1the farmers would do and providing the public input (R&D stocks) according to its social 
costs, once it is appropriately calculated. Under this assumption, the optimal public R&D 
investment should depend on some behavioural rule and on external variables, mainly prices 
including also the (social) price of the research itself. Under this general framework, not 
only its own price affects R&D investment. Also conventional private inputs influence 
someway the public R&D provision, while research investment can also affect, via R&D-
induced biases, the conventional inputs use. This is the general idea of the induced 
innovation hypothesis (Ruttan, 1997; Chavas et al., 1997, Esposti, 2000b). Finally, the 
relation between conventional (private) inputs cost and public R&D in this common 
behavioural framework, can allow to decompose the conventional total factor productivity 
growth attributing it to the R&D stock, the returns to scale and to the still unexplained 
residual.   
In this study, we model the technology of Italian agriculture with a variable cost 
function, which includes the public R&D stock among the quasi-fixed inputs. The paper 
shows how we have constructed the relevant research price and provides empirical evidence 
on three main aspects. Firstly, it assesses whether optimal investment really occurs from the 
social point of view and gives an estimate of the actual returns to R&D investment. 
Secondly, it analyses the interaction between knowledge stock and conventional inputs in 
Italian agricultural inputs, by testing the induced innovation hypothesis, as well. Finally, it 
disentangles the primal productivity growth in its cost-side components, including the 
contribution of changes in public R&D stock and of increasing returns to scale due to the 
public good.  
 
2.  Micro foundations and methodological issues  
2.1. A simple theory of public R&D investments 
A relevant impulse to the analysis of the role of the R&D investments on growth, of its 
returns and of the consequent aggregate economies of scale has been given by the so-called 
endogenous growth theory (Jones, 1995). On the empirical side, however, the separation of 
the various sources of growth, including R&D, has been accomplished only in recent years, 
thanks to developments in duality theory and of flexible functional forms (Morrison-
Schwartz, 1996a, 1996b; Morrison-Siegel, 1997; Nadiri-Mamuneas, 1994; Mamuneas-
Nadiri, 1996; Nadiri-Prucha, 1993). 
Under the hypothesis of cost minimisation, the variable cost function provides the dual 
representation of the agricultural short-run technology (Chambers, 1988):  
(1) Cv = G (W, X, S)  
where Cv is the minimised variable cost, W is the vector of price of the variable inputs V, X 
is the vector of the quantity of the quasi-fixed inputs with user cost P (not affecting the 
variable cost) and S is a vector of the fully exogenous variables. In this latter, usually the 
sectoral output Y is included together with a trend t, a proxy of the exogenous technological 
level, i.e. not explained by the public R&D investments
2. Equation (1) expresses the 
minimum expense W' V for the variable inputs. 
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  2The question is to understand how R&D enters this model
3. In a number of studies, 
research appears among the elements of S. Hence, likewise t, R&D would be fully 
exogenous and no adjustment to some long-run (cost-minimising) level takes place. This 
assumption can be too strong for private R&D investment; however, the hypothesis is more 
plausible and sometimes accepted if public research is considered (Kuroda, 1997; Mullen at 
al., 1996). 
Alternatively, the knowledge stock can be viewed as an element of X≡(XP, XR), where 
XR is public research and XP the vector of the remaining quasi-fixed inputs (Mamuneas- 
Nadiri, 1996). Under this hypothesis, the R&D stock becomes endogenous as a price driven 
adjustment can take place in the long run. This specification allows to measure the 
difference between observed and equilibrium public R&D stocks thus allowing to test the 
hypothesis of under (over) investment in agricultural research (Harris-Lloyd, 1991).  
Here, the key-element is the shadow price ZR=-∂G/∂XR, indicating the marginal 
contribution of R&D to the reduction of variable costs. The adjustment will last until ZR=PR 
and this is the basic behavioural rule driving the long-run R&D investments. However, who 
is going to carry out this adjustment? From a private point of view, farmers minimise (1) 
and do not bear any cost for using the public research capital (for them PR=0) (Morrison-
Schwartz, 1996b), hence in the long run they would demand R&D according to the 
behavioural rule ZR=PR=0. 
Decisions about public R&D investments, however, are taken by public institutions 
(Morrison-Siegel, 1997). Hence, from the social point of view, PR>0 (social cost) and the 
R&D adjustment will be lead by the behavioural rule ZR=PR>0. Therefore, we could analyse 
the public agricultural R&D investment by interpreting model (1) from the point of view of 
a social planner. He/She would minimise cost by considering both the public costs of the 
research and the private costs of the conventional inputs, and would invest in R&D to 
satisfy the long-run optimality condition G+ZP’XP+ZRXR =G+PP
                                                          
’XP+PRXR. In this 
framework it is possible to assess both whether the actual public R&D expenditure follows 
this social planner rule and how much the current R&D stock differs from the optimum. 
 
2.2. Public R&D and induced innovation 
The induced innovation hypothesis requires two distinct activities, at least: production 
and invention (Ruttan, 1997). For the induced innovation to hold, the conventional input a 
price increase should induce a reduction in the input use, through a selective research 
activity. Movement of (along) the Innovation Possibility Curve requires that resources be 
devoted to R&D before a new production process can be introduced. Therefore, if 
d(lnVj)/d(lnWj)<0 as effect of the research activity (since d(lnVj)/d(lnWj) =  ∂lnVj/∂lnXR x 
∂lnXR/∂lnWj  ) the induced innovation hypothesis holds (Chavas et al., 1997, Esposti, 
2000b). This hypothesis is empirically testable through price elasticity estimates.  
Firstly, while the short run price elasticities for variable inputs are calculated as usual 
as  εij=∂lnVi/∂lnWj with Σjεij=0, ∀i
4, εik=∂lnVi/∂lnXk measures the change of the variable 
 
3 It is usually excluded that the research input can behave as a variable input, since a several-years lag 
between the investment and the effects on production is always observed.  
4 From the sign (and the size) of these elasticities it is possible to assess if (and how much) the inputs are 
substitues (>0) or complements (<0). 
  3inputs use as the fixed input stocks change. Secondly, we can introduce the shadow prices 
elasticities, which provide information about the effects of other variables (prices and 
stocks) on the stock desired level. Shadow prices elasticities with respect to the variable 
inputs market prices, ϕkj=∂lnZk/∂lnWj, with Σjϕkj=1,∀k, can be interpreted as indirect 
measure of capacity utilisation. For instance, if ϕkj>0, an increase in Wj implies also an 





k increases). This effect 
would influence, in the long run, the optimal stock level  = ( W,P,Y,t), since it is 
obtained by equalising the shadow and the market prices (P
∗
k X
k=-∂G/∂Xk=Zk). Also the long 




i(W,X*(W,P,Y,t),Y,t) (Pierani and Rizzi, 1994). 
Combining all these elasticities for R&D provides useful information about the induced 
innovation hypothesis. ϕRj=∂lnZR/∂lnWj indicates how much the variable input price change 
provides incentives to invest more in public research; this incentive should then generate an 
increase in the research stock in the long run (∂lnXR/∂lnWj)
5. εjR=∂lnVj/∂lnXR indicates how 
the increase in the research effort actually and selectively affects the variable input use. The 
induced innovation hypothesis thus involves both the private (conventional input use) and 
the public (R&D investment) choices and the adjustment from the short to the long run. If 
ϕRj=∂lnZR/∂lnWj (and ∂lnXR/∂lnWj in the long run) > 0 and εjR=∂lnVj/∂lnXR < 0, then the 
results are consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis in the j-th variable input case.  
Finally, since the shadow prices depends also on the other stocks endowment, we can 
also calculate the following coefficients of flexibility: ϕkl=∂lnZk/∂lnXl. When two stocks are 
substitutes (complements) in the long run it follows that ϕkl<0 (ϕkl>0). Again, this measure 
can help in assessing the induced innovation hypothesis in the case of conventional quasi-
fixed inputs. ϕkR=∂lnZk/∂lnXR <0 means that an increase of R&D stock makes an 
investment in the for the k-th conventional stock less profitable. If also ∂lnXR/∂lnPk>0 in the 
long run, then the induced innovation hypothesis holds for the k-th stock
6.   
 
2.3. Productivity growth decomposition 
In our model, the growth of the total factor productivity (TFP) can be decomposed into 
the exogenous technical change and the other determinants such as capacity utilisation 
(Morrison-Diewert, 1990), scale effects and R&D contribution (Morrison-Siegel, 1998).  
Assuming perfect competition, Ohta (1974) showed that the dual technical change rate 
( Ct ε − ) equals the primal rate ( Yt ε ) adequately corrected by a scale factor ( CY ε ):  
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where the dot indicates the time derivative, Si is the i-th variable input total cost share and 
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  4εCY=  ∂lnC/∂lnY,  εCt=∂lnC/∂t,  εYt=∂lnY/∂t.
7 When some inputs are quasi-fixed and their 
stocks do not correspond to the long-run cost minimising levels (occurring when Pk= Zk= -
∂G/∂Xk), equation (2) does not hold anymore. Firstly, for fixed inputs, the value of the 
marginal productivity corresponds to its own shadow price and can differ from the market 
price Pk according to the disequilibrium of the factor endowment. Secondly, the short-run 
cost flexibility  CY ε  does not correspond to the inverse of the long run returns to scale, and 
can differ from 1 depending on the short run disequilibrium, therefore on the capacity 
utilisation. Morrison (1992) proposes a measure of this disequilibrium given by the ratio 
between the shadow and the actual total cost
8: CUC=C
*/C, also showing that it is a 
combination of the scale and subequilibrium effects: CUC  = [1-∑k(εkY/ )ε
L
CY ε Ck], where 
εCk=∂lnC/∂lnXk=(Pk-Zk)Xk/C is the cost flexibility with respect to the k-th stock; 
εkY=∂lnXk/∂lnY is the long run elasticity of the stock demand with respect to output and  
equals 1 under long run constant returns to scale;   is the long run cost flexibility, i.e. the 




k=Zk, therefore εCk=0  ∀k and the capacity is fully utilised (CUC=1). 
Alternatively,  εCk  can be positive or negative depending on whether there is excess or 
shortage of the stock Xk; the prevalence of under (CUC<1) or overutilisation (CUC>1) 
depends on the algebraic contribution of any stock.  
Equation (2) can be adjusted to have a correct measure of the short-run residual − , 
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where  , is the k-th stock shadow share on the total cost.   C X Z S k k k / =
∗
If for simplicity we assume constant returns to scale, the contribution of R&D to 
productivity growth emerges clearly; combining (3) with the expression of εCY,
9 the 
traditional (primal) total factor productivity growth measure can be disentangled as follows 
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CY kY CY CU ⋅ = −∑ ε ε ε ε ε 1
L
CY =ε  (Morrison, 1992). 
  5  
Equation (4) shows that the primal productivity growth  ) ( Yt ε is the algebraic sum of four 
distinct effects: the “real” exogenous technical change ( ), the “pure” long run scale 
effect, the disequilibrium effect due to conventional stock fixity and the disequilibrium 
effect due to R&D stock fixity
∗ − Ct ε
10. Therefore, under long run equilibrium, εCk=0 ∀k, the 
primal measure corresponds to the dual measure.   
 
3. Model  specification 
The agricultural technology is described by an aggregate production function, with 
three variable factors (inputs for animal production VA, inputs for crops VC and hired labour 
VL), three quasi-fixed inputs (family labour XF, physical capital XK and public research XR) 
and the disembodied exogenous technical change t. The aggregate variable cost function, 
dual to the production function, it is approximated with the Generalised Leontief (GL) 
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According to the Shephard Lemma, the variable inputs demand functions can be 
obtained by differentiating the variable cost function with respect to Wi : Vi = ∂G(.)/∂Wi (i = 
A,C,L).  
The parameters of the variable cost function are estimated by a system of four 
equations: the three variable input demands (in input-output form, to avoid possible 
heteroscedasticity):  
(6) V i /Y = (1/Y)∂G(.)/∂Wi + ui     (i = A,C,L) 
and the marginal cost equation: 
(7)  PY = ∂G/∂Y + uY      
where ui, uk and  uY  are I.I.D. disturbance terms. 
The maximum likelihood estimates and the approximate standard errors (White, 1980) 
are computed with the LSQ algorithm in TSP ver. 4.5. Based on the estimated parameters 
and the analytical derivatives of the cost function, all the relevant measures concerning the 
research stock can be derived. Furthermore, through the R&D shadow price we can 
calculate the Internal Rate of Returns (IRR) to R&D investments in the short run and 
compare it with the long run returns (Thirtle-Bottomley, 1989; Schimmelpfenning et al., 
2000). The marginal value of an unit increase in the R&D stock in the short run is provided 
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  6where  LR is the maximum length admitted for the investment effects and wn is the 
age/efficiency function of the research investment over the LR period (Esposti-Pierani, 
2000b). In the long run the marginal value is the long run marginal productivity, therefore 




















4. Data   
The R&D stock price plays a major role in the depicted model and it has to be 
adequately defined (Morrison – Schwartz, 1996b). Firstly, the nominal R&D investments 
have to be correctly deflated to allow intertemporal comparison on a real base. This is the 
problem of the Investment Price Index (IPI), which has always to be calculated either when 
the R&D enters the model as stock or as flow, as exogenous shifter or as quasi-fixed factor. 
Secondly, if the R&D stock enters as a quasi-fixed input and if the social planner point of 
view has to be considered, the calculation of an appropriate R&D stock user cost (to be used 
as PR) is needed and it requires the construction of a Stock Price Index (SPI).    
The problem of the R&D IPI has been already raised in the literature. Many studies still 
use the GDP deflator or the Consumer Price Index when no alternative index is available  
(Morrison-Siegel, 1997; Thirtle-Bottomley, 1989)
11. However, it is largely acknowledged 
that the composition of research expenditure relevantly differs from the composition of 
national product. The use of the GDP deflator can thus significantly bias the real R&D 
effort (Mansfield et al., 1983). A proper IPI has to be based on the actual composition of the 
R&D expenditure that can, in turn, change over sectors and over different kinds of research 
effort (basic, applied, development). Mansfield (1984; 1987) calculates an R&D IPI based 
upon a survey on 100 manufacturing firms. However, this index could not necessarily be 
also valid for the agricultural sector and for public R&D. Dealing with the public R&D 
capital, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) use the price deflator of the government purchases of 
goods and services. For the agricultural public R&D, Pardey et al. (1989) and Bengston 
(1989) define an appropriate IPI based on the expenditures composition of the State 
Agricultural Experimental Stations.  
In our work we follow this general idea to estimate the specific IPI for the Italian public 
agricultural R&D expenditure composition
12.  
The SPI is affected by the IPI but does not coincide with it. In fact, the implicit R&D 
stock price at time t is the cost beard to hold one unit of stock in that year. This user cost is 
determined by three components (Caiumi et al., 1995): the opportunity cost of the invested 
money, capital gains or losses caused by inflation, and capital depreciation. Jorgenson 
(1989) proposes a specification of the user cost that can be written as follows: 
(10)  SPIt = IPIt-1[rt - πt+ (1+πt)ρ t] 
where r is the interest rate, π is the expected capital gain (or loss) rate due to inflation, and 
ρ is the R&D stock depreciation rate. In equation (10), Pt-1(rt-πt) expresses in real terms the 
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  7opportunity cost of a unit of invested capital, while Pt-1(1+πt)ρt is the depreciation 
corrected for inflation. Confirming previous results (Griliches, 1984; Mansfield 1984 and 
1987), the GDP deflator overestimates the real research investment increase: the average 
annual growth during the period 1960-1995 is 6,4% when the GDP deflator is used, while it 
is 5,1% with the IPI.  
All the data, except the R&D investments, are taken from the AGRIFIT database for the 
Italian agriculture (Caiumi et al., 1995 ). The public agriculture R&D investments include 
all the public expenditure (government, public University, regions, other public research 
institutions) and are described in Esposti-Pierani (2000a). The R&D stock series (figure 1) 
have been calculated from the investment series using the parameters calculated in Esposti-
Pierani (2000b) where also the R&D stock depreciation rate is reported; this is needed for 
the calculation of the SPI. Inflation and interest rates are taken from AGRIFIT. Finally, for 
the calculation of the IPI, the salary index for the R&D labour has been taken from Franco 
(1993), while the investment price index comes from AGRIFIT. The fixed weights among 
research sources and inputs have been taken from ISTAT (various years). These data, and 
the following econometric analysis, cover the period 1960-1995.  
 
5. Estimation  results 
In general terms, the estimation provides satisfactory results. Most parameters are 
statistically significant
13. As expected, the cost function is monotonous in W and Y (non- 
decreasing) and in the three stocks (not increasing) in the entire sample. Moreover, the 
estimated function is concave in W and convex in both conventional stocks (XK and XF) in 
any sample point. However, is convex in XK only in some sample points; we will comment 
on this later on. The model goodness of fit (R
2) varies from a minimum of 0.87, for the 
demand of the inputs for animal production, to 0.99 for the marginal cost equation. 
Table 1 assembles all the short-run partial equilibrium indicators discussed in section 2. 
Since the dual measure CUC depends on the stocks disequilibrium, the partial utilisation for 
the three stocks are also reported as the ratio between the estimated shadow price and the 
rental (market) price. Figure 2 reports the estimated CUC over the all sample; it clearly 
shows that the Italian agriculture passes from overall over utilisation to under utilisation 
around 1980. Therefore, estimates are reported also for the sub periods 1960-1980 and 
1981-1995. A different behaviour emerges for family labour and physical capital. Capital 
shows large over-utilisation in the first period and, then, an evident under utilisation; these 
two patterns compensate in the whole period when the capacity utilisation is slightly over 
the equilibrium. As expected, family labour is always excessive since capacity utilisation is 
always under 1, particularly in the second period. Therefore, both the constant decline of 
family labour and the constant growth of investment in physical capital in Italian agriculture 
can be interpreted as the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium levels although the 
adjustment is someway partial in the case of labour while, on the contrary, we observe over-
adjustment in the case of capital.  
The pattern of the R&D stock follows to some extent what observed for the to physical 
capital stock; we observe overutilization in the first period and large underutilisation in the 
second one. The interpretation of this result from a social point of view (in fact, the long run 
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  8equilibrium is reached when ZR=PR>0) is that the public R&D investment is short until the 
eighties and then largely excessive in last fifteen years. Also in the case we can interpret this 
behaviour as over-adjustment which is, however, much more evident in the case of the 
public good since the utilisation over the whole period is evidently less than one (about 0.6).  
The different pattern of the conventional and non conventional stocks with respect to the 
long-run equilibrium level, eventually explain the overall CUC which is quite close to one 
over the whole sample: over the whole period, a 7% excess of production capacity is 
observed.   
Since, the variable cost is decreasing in R&D, it follows that returns to research are 
positive. Therefore, the R&D IRR can be correctly computed from equations (8) and (9) and 
the estimated shadow prices and elasticities. The calculation is based on a 20-years 
maximum length of the research effects (Schimmelpfenning et al., 2000); therefore, data of 
period 1976-95 is considered. Table 2 clearly indicates that the returns computed under the 
short run (temporary) equilibrium is much lower than the long run case. This latter is 
however an unreliable measure since it refers to the long-run equilibrium which is not 
actually observed and clearly shows how IRR calculations can be strongly affected by 
model specification. The short-run measure is indeed the correct one and is much lower than 
the average estimates reported in the literature (Alston et al., 2000), which, in turn, are 
commonly acknowledged as excessive. A 4,2% is a more plausible return, if compared to 
other long-run investment; moreover, although the R&D investment could be considered as 
a risky one, the expected risk premium is probably lower in the case of public expenditure 
compared to private investments.  
  
5.1 Elasticities and induced innovation   
Table 3 reports the estimates of the short run input demand elasticties in the sample 
mean. They seem correctly estimated for variable inputs since the direct price elasticities 
show the correct signs, all effects are lower than 1, suggesting a rigid production structure, 
and all the estimates are statistically significant. In the short run, the intermediate inputs VA 
and VC are substitutes for labour, and slightly complements between them. More relevant 
response can be observed to changes in conventional stocks. In particular, VA is 
complement to capital and substitute for family labour; VC and VL are both substitute for 
capital and complement to the family labour. 
The main interest here, however, is for the relation between the non-conventional R&D 
stock and the conventional inputs use and price. On the one hand, increase in variable inputs 
price induces growth in the R&D shadow price in the case of VA and VC and decline in the 
case VL. On the other hand, increase in the R&D stock reduces use of both VA and VC while 
increases the use of hired labour. In the case of the conventional stocks, in the short run both 
physical capital and family labour behaves as complements to R&D stock, while are 
substitutes between them. According to the discussion in section 2.2, these results suggest 
that the induced innovation hypothesis could be consistent for VA and VC and not for both 
hired and family labour and for physical capital. Except for physical capital, these results 
confirm previous studies on induced innovation in the Italian agriculture (Esposti, 2000b).  
Table 3 shows that for the sample average, but also for most sample points, it results 
∂lnZR/∂lnXR>0 which also implies that the variable cost function in not convex in XR as it is 
for the conventional stocks. On the one hand this results, suggest that marginal returns to 
  9R&D stock are not decreasing as for all the conventional inputs. On the other hand, it also 
follows that it would be convenient to invest in R&D indefinitely and no the long run 
equilibrium level could not be reached unless ∂lnXR/∂lnPR>0 in the long run. Nevertheless, 
this is what happens in most sample point and in sample average (table 4). Differently from 
the conventional inputs, it results ∂lnXR/∂lnPR>0 suggesting that the investment behaviour 
of the hypothetical social planner is guided by some different non-economic criteria, but 
still allowing the long-run cost minimising investment rule ZR=PR>0 to hold.  
This particular character of the R&D stock and the behaviour of the public investor also 
affect the consistency of the induced innovation hypothesis. As stated in section 2.2, 
however, for induced innovation really occur in the long run it has to be ∂lnZR/∂lnXR<0 and 
(∂lnXR/∂lnPR)<0. Otherwise, ∂lnZR/∂lnWi>0 in the short run would not generate an 
incentive to increase the R&D stock in the long run. Table 4 shows that this actually 
happens: VA and VC are complements to R&D while VL is substitute, in contradiction with 
the short-run evidence. Therefore, although the induced innovation is consistent in the short-
run, it does not really occur since it is contradicted by the actual R&D investment 
behaviour. 
As expected, with the only exception of the elasticity between VL and VC, in the long 
run the variable inputs demand is more responsive (table 4), as stated by the Le Chatelier 
principle
14. With the already mentioned exception of R&D, all directed elasticities are 
correctly negative. VA and VL remain substitutes in the long run, while VC and VL become 
complements, VA and VC substitutes. In the long run, the variable inputs are also substitutes 
for the physical capital, with the only exception of VA which is Allen complement. The 
opposite happens with the family labour: VC and VL are complements, while VA  is 
substitute. Also the two conventional stocks, capital and family labour, behaves as 
substitutes. 
 
5.2. Productivity growth decomposition 
  Table 5 reports the decomposition of the primal productivity growth measure as 
described in section 2.3. First of all it shows that in the whole period, and in the two sub-
periods, there is still an unexplained productivity growth
15,  , of about 1,4% per year. 
The results also confirm that, by introducing the public R&D input in the sectoral 
technology, the aggregate returns to scale can be increasing; in fact, the cost flexibility 
is constantly around .70-.80 indicating returns to scale of about 1.35. Increasing returns 





Yt ε . 
However, the decomposition of the primal productivity is also affected by the stocks 
utilisation itself. As emerges from table 5, while R&D disequilibrium has a negligible effect 
on the productivity measure, much more relevant are the conventional stocks. In particular, 
considering the whole period, the physical capital eventually corrects the primal measure 
upward while the family labour corrects downward. Putting together all the components,  
                                                           
14 It must be noted, however, that while most of the short-run elasticities are statistically significant, this does 
no hold in the long run. In particular, cross-elasticites are hardly significant in the case of VC, XK and, mainly, 
R&D. 
15  It is the exogenous technical change measured as rate of reduction of the short run cost, i.e. ∂lnG/∂t. 
  10the primal productivity growth measure turns out to be lower by 0.4% per year. 
This residual productivity growth, i.e. the exogenous technical change rate, also affects 
the variable inputs use (table 6). The estimated exogenous technical change saves the inputs 
for animal production (-.046) while uses inputs and for crops (.029) and hired labour (-
.011). These biases are at odds with the inputs growth rate and, in fact, are not strong 
enough to prevent the decline of hired labour use in absolute terms, evidently driven by the 
relative prices dynamics. It must also be noted that for VA and VL the effect of the 
exogenous technical change is in concordance with the effect of R&D (table 3): both effects 
induce saving of VA and use of VL while they end to compensate in the case of VC. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks  
This paper aims to analyse the role of the public R&D investments in the Italian 
agriculture with major reference to its long run equilibrium level, the interaction with the 
conventional private farm inputs and the contribution to productivity growth and returns to 
scale. The study uses an econometric model taking into account the public good nature of 
this input as well its endogenous long run optimal level. This model allows to explicitly test 
the hypothesis of over or under-investment in public agricultural R&D by calculating an 
appropriate public research price index. The study would benefit from longer time series of 
public R&D investments and prices. Moreover, the appropriate calculation of the R&D 
stock price would require more detailed information about the sources and composition of 
the research spending. Further research effort in data analysis and construction is therefore 
needed.     
The empirical evidence suggests that, whenever the partial equilibrium in R&D stock 
endowment is admitted, the estimated returns are lower than 5%, thus much more plausible 
if compared to alternative investments with similar associated risk. According to the 
estimation results, the Italian agriculture shows under-investment in public R&D in the 
sixties and seventies, while this investment becomes largely excessive in the eighties and 
nineties.  Therefore, the recent reduction of the public research expenditure (in real terms)  
could be explained as a rationale response of the hypothetical underlying social planner to 
the over-investment of the previous years and that made the provision of public R&D sub-
optimal.  It also emerges that induced innovation hypothesis, while in principle consistent 
with the short run evidence, is not actually supported by a consequent long-run R&D 
investment behaviour.       
The depicted framework confirms that public R&D stock contributes in generating 
increasing returns to scale at the sectoral level. Moreover, it is also possible to disentangle 
primal productivity growth. Even when the impact of the R&D investment, the scale and the 
capacity utilisation effects are appropriately admitted and separated, there is still a 
significant space left to the exogenous time trend on both the cost reduction and inputs use. 
This result also indicates that other sources of agricultural innovations should be considered 
more in detail. In particular, intersectoral and international spillovers, both private and 
public, could explain technical change besides (or together with) the national public 
agricultural R&D (Mamuneas-Nadiri, 1996). Some steps in this direction have been taken in 
analysing the Italian agriculture case (Esposti, 2000a). However, so far, data available for 
spillovers calculation, do not allow long enough time series to be included in the model here 
adopted.          
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  14Table 1: Capacity Utilisation of R&D and conventional stocks  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 
































Table 2: Internal rate of returns (IRR) to R&D under alternative hypotheses  
Hypotheses  TRI 
Short run equilibrium  4,2%
Long run equilibrium  161%





Table 3 : Short run demand elasticity and shadow prices flexibility  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 
















































































  15Table 4: Long run demand elasticity  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 






















































































Table 5: Primal productivity growth and its components 
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Table 6 - Exogenous technical change rate and technological biases  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 
1960-95 Share  Bias  Growth  rate 






















Weighted sum    1  0  .010 
 
  16Figure 1 – Public agricultural R&D stock in Italy (billions of 1985 Italian Lire) and its 
























































































































































































Figure 2 - Estimated CUC over the all sample period 
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